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Judith Butler’s latest release, The Force of Nonviolence: An Ethico-Political Bind, is a 
slender yet dense collection of essays animated by Butler’s distinctive intellectual 
intensity and political engagement. It is a creative inquiry into non-violence as an 
ethical and political exigency, inextricably linked to the pursuit of social equality. Many 
issues raised in this book find echo in Butler’s previous works whilst others appear as 
more novel, warranting meditation. Additionally, the book’s saliency rests on its 
ambition to contribute to the ever-so-contemporary struggles for social (including 
gender and racial) equality. 
 
In the introduction Butler’s wager is clearly spelled out: understanding non-violence 
depends on understanding violence and this is not an innocent epistemic operation 
but always an ethical and political gesture. This is because ‘violence’ is a contested 
concept, neither empirically nor normatively settled, but always at stake, a crucial 
stake, in political struggles: naming violence is an instrumentum regnii which can 
enhance the power of whom has control over this practice by disqualifying, ethically, 
its opponents whilst justifying their oppression/elimination (p. 5). 
 
Hence, a value-free definition of violence/non-violence is untenable or rather, always 
already a political decision. Coherently with this epistemic-ethico-political perspective, 
Butler proposes to chart those ‘political frameworks’ (p. 15) within which violence is 
elaborated and justified, to deconstruct their functioning diagrams and reality effects. 
This critical endeavour is then complemented by a praxeological effort: to oppose to 
those schemata an ethico-political framework, predicated on interdependency, which 
legitimises nonviolence as a never-exhausting tension toward equality (and which 
equality circularly fuels).  
 
The first target of Butler’s critique is the Hobbesian social contract, assumed as the 
foundational source of a whole political imaginary which hinges on violence as a 
pervasive pharmakon - both problem (the bellum omnium contra omnes) and solution 
(the Leviathan’s sword and pastoral). Butler conceptualises this framework, drawing 
upon Melanie Klein, as a ‘phantasy’ (p. 35) - a partly unconscious and socially shared 
fantasy that structures our modes of perceiving. Namely, Butler takes issues with the 
Hobbesian phantasy’s individualistic and non-egalitarian nature. 
 
Hobbes, in fact, presupposes self-sufficient, always-adult and gendered individuals 
constituting the polity, endowing the Leviathan with their right to violence to prevent 
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the pervasive yet potential violence of the state of nature. Against this backdrop, Butler 
argues that ‘No one is born an individual; if someone becomes an individual overtime, 
he or she does not escape the fundamental conditions of dependency in the course of 
that process’ (p. 41). Interdependency from others but also from structures, 
institutions, practices, objects, is what makes life possible (and as such prior logically 
and historically to individuation). It follows that, destroying ‘the other’ means, at a level 
of phantasy, to ‘imperil one’s own life’ (p. 95). 
Yet, this originary social bond, modelled around the parent-child love/hate relationship, 
is not immune from violence: ‘violent potential emerges as a feature of all relations of 
interdependency’ (p. 105), thus the issue becomes to reckon with such an 
ambivalence, without disavowing it (as Hobbes instead does), creating social 
obligations to check that potential whilst educating critically its ‘bonding’ power.  
 
From this angle, Butler deconstructs the most elementary justification of violence - 
self-defence. Deconstructing, here, entails something less (normatively) than 
invalidating. In fact, Butler circumvents, pragmatically, the general un/justifiability of 
self-defence, stating that ‘nonviolence is not an absolute principle, but an open-ended 
struggle with violence’ (p. 56), opening to some unspecified conditions under which 
self-defence would be justified. Instead, her focus is on unpacking self-defence by 
asking what is a ‘self’ and which are its boundaries. The ‘self’ of self-defence is an 
individualistic entity, a category predicated on the Hobbesian disavowal of 
interdependence and defined on ‘demographic basis’ (p. 55). This means that the 
identity of those I’m allowed to defend by recourse to violence are those lives written 
as grievable: registered as lives whose loss would matter and therefore ought to be 
safeguarded. The point, at once ethical and political, is to figure out the roots of the 
unequal distribution of grievability as a precondition of apprehending (and 
appropriating) violence, a Butler’s well known theme at least since Frames of War 
(2009).  
 
Mobilising Michel Foucault and Franz Fanon, Butler sees this discrimination between 
grievable and ungrievable lives as an expression of the ‘make live and let die’ bio-
political dynamic driven by historical racial parameters. Accordingly, it becomes 
possible to interpret the state-led disavowal of responsibility for the populations who 
are literally let die (p. 121) (e.g. immigrants drowning weekly in the Mediterranean Sea 
or minorities suffocated by police chokeholds), as a racialised biopolitical decision, 
enacted as ‘necessary’ violence and often justified in terms of preventive self-defence. 
 
Is a ‘more just’ law the way to redress those inversions and safeguarding the 
ungrievable lives? Certainly not, Butler contends. Here, in a compelling dialogue with 
Walter Benjamin (p. 122), Butler engages with a critique of the legal-instrumentalist 
justification of violence. Law is a product of violence and to use it as the regulative 
framework of violence - as if violence which becomes law would magically purify itself 
- is an irrational double bind. Instead, we should look at what Benjamin calls, in his 
Critique of Violence, ‘technique of civil conflict resolution’. This ‘technique’ is not 
3 
designed to achieve an end; instead, it is an end in itself that ‘exceeds both an 
instrumental logic and any teleological scheme of development - it is an ungoverned 
technique, arguably ungovernable’ (p. 125). Such a ‘pure means’ would elude violence 
by rejecting both the superimposition of an external end and any form of ‘legalisation’, 
that is, of insertion in the order of the state. When and where is this technique in action? 
Or how to implement it? ‘Language’, Benjamin states, is the only place inaccessible to 
violence (p. 126). Butler interprets this cryptic statement in light of Benjamin’s work on 
translation: the task of translation is ‘furthering understanding where there was one 
impasse or even conflict’, and its logic is the law of translation, ‘a pre- or extra-
contractual technique of conflict resolution’ (p. 127). Translation intensifies 
communicability creating space for agreement, a space emptied by any justification of 
violence.  
 
Nonviolence is this ethico-political operation of exposing which and how epistemic 
frameworks ‘legalise’ violence-as-a-means, whilst generating competing frameworks 
to intensify communicability by situating and naming practices of resistance (p. 147) 
which recognise/cultivate interdependency, without ‘decaying’ into law. 
 
But advocating nonviolence without supporting equality is a dangerous exercise, 
Butler claims. Equality, here, is lives’ equal grievability: every single life matters exactly 
the same, and this is the ‘demographic precondition for an ethics of nonviolence’ (p. 
56). This means that the ‘interdiction to kill’ entails addressing preliminarily the 
(biopolitical and racial) discriminations between those who are considered living and 
those who are not, the constitutive ambivalence of the violent potential of 
interdependency, as well as the unit of analysis of such operations. 
 
Butler argues that overall this understanding should lead us to counter the biopolitical 
(preventive) self-defence which authorises the state-led killing/let-die of entire 
populations deemed ungrievable.  
 
The book concludes with a praxeological proposal (p. 167), inspired by Sigmund 
Freud’s notion of mania. Mania is a revolt against the superego’s unrestrained power 
(which manifests itself by introjecting violence to counter violence) aiming to interrupt 
the ‘vicious circle in which destructiveness is countered by self-destructiveness’ (p. 
167). Butler here uses mania as an epistemic-political category: mania helps 
understanding ‘forms of insurrectionary solidarity that turn against authoritarian and 
tyrannical rule’ (p. 168). Although mania is not a political instrument, it does 
‘introduce[s] a vigorous form of “unrealism” into modes of solidarity’ (p. 171) against 
tyranny. This perspective is well illustrated in the postscript to the book, dedicated to 
the ‘Ni Una Menos’ movement against ‘feminicidio’, that is, to the Latin American (now 
global) movement against the systemic-heteronormative violence predicated on the 
ungrievability of women’s lives. 
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‘Ni una meno’ politicises mania by the deliberate exposing of bodies to power, 
endangering (further) protesters’ lives. The exposure of dependency here is not an 
impasse but a condition of productive, non-individualistic, social bonds. This tactic 
does not intend to create fix ‘vulnerable identities’ (as state agencies sometimes do in 
paternalistic way) but to express a type of (nonviolent) strength against (violent) 
individualistic power (p. 202), in a context where equality is demanded and the 
ambivalence of social bond acknowledged.  
 
The Force of Nonviolence is an ‘untimely’ book, an intervention against our time, 
marked by non-violence’s minimal popularity and even less political currency. Butler 
tries to enfranchise non-violence from its popular representations as ‘stoic’ practice, 
highlighting its organic ambivalence, as always already enmeshed with aggressivity, 
and its intellectual ambiguity, as at once a socio-political and psychic entity.  
 
A critical book, aiming to uncover the condition of our present way of reasoning about 
violence and non-violence, deconstructing both instrumental definitions of preventive 
self-defence and left libertarian approaches to non-violence as an unrealistic 
divertissement. The book does not provide a rational justification for nonviolence. 
Instead, it reformulates, with respect to nonviolence, Butler’s key themes around the 
structure of social bonds, their psychic lives and ethico-political potential. 
 
A number of conceptual and meta-theoretical dissonances make the book even more 
generative. The idea of nonviolence as something less than an absolute principle 
renders the book’s proposal pragmatic but also slightly ambiguous and normatively 
impoverished. The dialogue with Benjamin is fascinating but, following Hannah Arendt 
and Jacques Derrida, Butler over-cautiously disavows a confrontation with the 
messianic/an-archist import of Benjamin’s ‘divine violence’. The aggressivity implicit in 
any social bond is a key contribution, but there is little on how to check socially its 
destructive potential, apart from a line on ‘global obligations’. Overall, the book hinges 
on Butler’s well known endeavour to cast epistemic, ethical and political spheres 
against a psycho-social backdrop. The result is the blurring of any threshold between 
the normative, the psychic and the organic, between nature and logos, with continuous 
(at times disorientating) shifts from explaining to justifying non-violence. Provocation 
here lies in the (deliberate?) chaos produced by these naturalistic fallacies whilst 
gathering Foucault and Fanon, Freud, Klein and Benjamin, thoroughly ‘bricolaging’ 
their thoughts beyond any philological and historical consideration.  
 
Butler's voice is and has always been an exception to Roland Barthes’ idea that the 
death of the author is (and ought to be) the birth of the reader. This is because Butler’s 
lively ecriture feminine does not conclude, cannot be enclosed, her generative (and 
sometimes dissonant) interpretations shake and provoke, galvanising the reader more 
than soliciting acquiescent analysis. This is also the force of this book: an unsettling, 
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